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Comments
THE MOON TREATY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
This Comment explores the connections between the law of the
sea and the evolving law of outer space. The question of resource
exploitation, common to both areas of the law, will remain the
subject of heated international debate until a practical method of
resource management is adopted. Law of the sea experience il-
lustrates the diffiulties encountered when legal norms trail be-
hind technological advances. The wiser course would be to set up
the basic framework in advance of technology. If this were done,
the law would determine the direction of technology, rather than
technological might and clamorous marketplace interests deter-
mining the law.
INTRODUCTION
In this half of the Twentieth Century the international commu-
nity faces the intricate task of fashioning a world order with a
global perspective. The traditional concept of national sover-
eignty still dominates; but international law bars its extension to
unoccupied territories by force,' discovery,2 or international
claim.3 Areas that are beyond present national jurisdiction 4 are to
1. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
International reaction to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December of
1979 suggests that forceful extension of sovereignty into occupied territory is also
unacceptable in theory even though tolerated in practice.
2. For example, territorial claims to Antarctica have been suspended in favor
of indefinite international control by the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T.
794, T.I.AS. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
3. On November 14, 1974, Deepsea Ventures, Inc., a private United States
company, filed a "Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and
Request for Diplomatic Protection" with various governments and private firms
worldwide, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 51 (1975). The claim was re-
jected by all responding governments including the United States.
4. The most widely acknowledged "common spaces" are the antarctic, the
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be maintained as common areas governed by the international
community as a whole.5
The negotiations of the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea represent the first comprehensive attempt to set up
such an international order.6 The ideological debate7 has been
fueled, distorted, and prolonged by self-serving economic inter-
ests,8 but much of the work has been completed.9 The progress
achieved at the most recent session of the Third United Nations
Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS IU) indicates that an
international treaty governing the seabed may be imminent.10
During the seven years of deliberations, the issue of deep seabed
mining was the primary source of discord." An uneasy compro-
mise on this issue has finally been achieved, but the underlying
normative questions remain unanswered.12
In a separate United Nations arena the United Nations Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) has been
drafting an international treaty concerning the moon.13 This par-
allel attempt to create an international order has been less turbu-
lent than the law of the sea negotiations because there are fewer
special interest groups clamoring to protect their particular eco-
nomic interests. Because little is known about the natural re-
sources of the moon, it is possible to negotiate primarily on the
high seas, the deep seabed, and outer space. See generally Note, Thaw in Interna-
tional Law? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE L.J.
804 (1978).
5. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite
Negotiating Text/Revision 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ICNT/Rev. 2]; Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 7, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.LA.S.
No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2.
6. The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in
1958, and efforts to establish a comprehensive international regime for the seabed
began in 1973.
7. See text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 74-75 infra.
9. Moore, Law and Foreign Policy of the Oceans, 9 CAL. W. INT'L Lj. 522, 530
(1979) ("[N]inety to ninety-five percent of the work of the Conference has been
completed in a manner that is satisfactory for United States oceans interests and
for the common interest in general.").
10. ICNT/Rev. 2, supra note 5.
11. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9, at 532 (all the remaining problems can be
resolved "if and when we can solve the question of deep sea-bed mining"). See
generally Haight, Law of the Sea Conference-Why Paralysis?, 8 J. MAP. L, & COM.
281 (1977).
12. See text accompanying note 68 infra.
13. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Ce-
lestial Bodies, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 33, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/240 (1979), re-
printed in 7 J. SPACE L. 165 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Moon Treaty].
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basis of principle without the divisive pressures of specific mar-
ketplace interests. At some level, of course, ideology determines
economics,14 so it should come as no surprise that the major point
of contention throughout the negotiations has been the issue of
the commercial exploitation of the moon's natural resources.15
At its 1979 session the UNCOPUOS negotiated a compromise
which enabled it to reach consensus on a draft treaty.16 On De-
cember 14, 1979, the "Agreement Governing Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies"17 (commonly known as the
Moon Treaty) was adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly8 and has been commended to member States for signature
and ratification. Now that the treaty is ready for signing, the
United States is hesitating while Congress and the Administra-
tion take a closer look at what effect the Moon Treaty will have on
international law in general and on the law of the sea negotiations
in particular.19 This Comment will explore the connections be-
tween the two agreements and discuss their joint contribution to
the evolving concept of international control of areas beyond na-
tional jurisdiction.
TRADrrIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
Prior to the United Nations Law of the Sea negotiations, the Ge-
neva Convention on the High Seas20 codified the doctrine of free-
dom of the high seas based on three centuries of customary law.21
The provisions of this document are reiterated without substan-
14. Or perhaps it is the other way around.
15. Chen, Pending Issues Before the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Na-
tions Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE L. 29, 29 (1977);
Hosenball, Current Issues of Space Law Before the United Nations, 2 J. SPACE L 5,
8 (1974).
16. See Hosenball, The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space: Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges, 7 J. SPACE L. 95, 99-
100 (1979); 16 U.N. CHRONICLE 36 (1979).
17. GA. Res. 36/68, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/68 (1979).
18. 17 U.N. CHRONICLE 43 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Lunar Dustup, TME, Mar. 24, 1980, at 47.
20. Done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.IA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
21. The fundamental principles are set forth as follows:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by other
tial change22 in the negotiating text of the continuing United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea.23 A great deal of debate
centers on whether or not deep seabed mining is permissible
under existing international law.24 The United States claims that
it is,25 while the bloc of developing nations known as the Group of
7726 claims that it is not.27
The United States claim that deep seabed mining is a freedom
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and
non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, id. art. 2.
22. That is except for the enumeration of two additional freedoms: the free-
dom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under interna-
tional law, and the freedom of scientific research.
23. ICNT/Rev. 2, supra note 5.
24. This debate has been extensively analyzed and will only be mentioned in
passing here. See, e.g., Burton, Freedom of the Seas: International Law Applica-
ble to Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (1977); Murphy, The Poli-
tics of Manganese Nodules: International Considerations and Domestic
Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 536-38 (1979); Note, Murky Waters: Private
Claims to Deep Ocean Seabed Minerals, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1237 (1975).
25. The executive branch has stated repeatedly that deep seabed mining can
proceed under international law. See, e.g., United States Oceans Policy, 6 WEEKLY
Comp. OF PRES. Doc. 677, 678 (May 23, 1970). The legislative branch works from
the same assumption. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Minerals,
Materials and Fuels, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 944, 975 (1974) (statement of John Moore,
Chairman of NSC Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea); Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 50 (1973) (statement of Charles Brower, Act-
ing Legal Advisor to the Dep't of State); Hearings on the Outer Continental Shelf
Before the Special Senate Subcomm. on the Outer Continental Shelf, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 210 (1970) (statement of John Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Dep't of
State). The underlying concept is not a novel one:
[W] hen the slave says: "The sea is certainly common to all persons," the
fisherman agrees; but when the slave adds: 'Then what is found in the
common sea is common property," he rightly objects, saying- "But what
my net and hooks have taken, is absolutely my own."
H. GRoTus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 29 (trans. New York 1916) (1st ed. anon.
n.p. 1608) (quoting from Plautus).
26. The countries that comprise this bloc are referred to variously as "less-de-
veloped countries," 'Third World countries," "developing countries," or "underde-
veloped countries." These terms refer to approximately 119 countries located
primarily in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Friedman & Williams, The Group of
77 at the United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 555, 555 (1979).
27. 9 UNCLOS M OR (109th mtg.) 103, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62 (1978) (state-
ment by Chairman of the Group of 77); Statement Declaring the Position of the
Group of 77 on Unilateral Legislation Affecting the Resources of the Deep Seabed
(Sept. 15, 1978), reprinted in 10 LAw. AMERicAS 977 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Statement of the Group of 77]. Compare id. with 9 UNCLOS II OR (109th mtg.)
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under the rubric of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas
rests on dubious legislative history28 The argument that mining
can proceed under the auspices of customary international law29
is equally tenuous 30 because there is no actual custom, and the
suggested precedents 31 and analogies32 "are either inapposite or
104, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62 (1978) (statement of U.S. Ambassador Elliot Richard-
son).
28. The International Law Commission, which drafted the final text of the Ge-
neva Convention, made the following statement:
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in [Article 2] is not restric-
tive. The Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms, but
it is aware that there are other freedoms .... The Commission has not
made specific mention of the freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of
the high seas. It is considered that... such exploitation had not yet as-
sumed sufficient practical importance to justify special regulation.
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 7, U.N. Doe. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Ie'L L.
Comr'N 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1956/Add.1.
In support of the United States position, many writers argue that this statement
establishes, at least by implication, that deep seabed mining is a high seas free-
dom. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 24, at 1173; Pietrowski, Hard Minerals on the
Deep Ocean Floor: Implications for American Law and Policy, 19 Wm & MARY L.
REV. 43, 53-54 (1977). But see Note, supra note 24, at 1244-45.
There is, however, an equally persuasive counterargument. Paragraph five of
the same report reads: "Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all
entitled to enjoy it, must be regulated." Report of the International Law Commis-
sion to the General Assembly, supra. In this context the statement that exploita-
tion of the subsoil "had not yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify
special regulation" implies that deep seabed mining would have to be regulated
separately and was not included in the freedoms regulated by the Geneva Con-
vention. See Biggs, Deepsea's Adventures: Grotius Revisited-A Rejoinder, 10
IN'., LAW. 309, 315 (1976).
29. See, e.g., Pietrowski, supra note 28, at 51.
30. See, e.g., Saffo, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the General Assem-
bly Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 Tu L. Rmv. 492, 506 (1979).
31. E.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.LJ., ser. A/B, No. 53, at
43-75 ("[VI ery little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights," was nec-
essary to establish sovereignty as long as no other State could make out a superior
claim, id. at 46); Clipperton Island Arbitration (Mexico v. France), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1105 (1931) (France's claim to Clipperton Island upheld even though no
French nationals settled the island and French authorities visited there only spo-
radically); Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829, 840 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1928) (manifestations of sovereignty assume dif-
ferent forms according to conditions of time and place and need not be exercised
in fact at every moment on every point of a territory).
32. Conflicting claims to the island of Spitzenbergen were resolved by the
Treaty on Spitzenbergen, done Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892, T.S. No. 686, 2 L.N.T.S. 7,
which obligated Norway to recognize the "acquired rights" of other nationals. Id.
art. 6. Those who employ the analogy argue that rights to seabed resources may
be acquired by the act of exploitation as were rights to coal on Spitzenbergen
prior to the treaty. See, e.g., N. ELY, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE To DEEPSEA
MINIG 4243 (1974); Goldie, A General International Law Doctrine for Seabed Re-
459
incomplete." 33 Furthermore, all attempts to proceed with deep
seabed mining have been protested vigorously,3 4 indicating a lack
of the general consensus necessary to establish customary law. 35
If there is no existing law on the subject, deep seabed mining
might proceed under the maxim that "what is not forbidden is al-
lowed."36 It is occasionally argued that mining can proceed be-
cause no binding international law forbids it.37 The counter-
argument, voiced frequently by the representatives of the devel-
oping countries, is that contemporary law evolving from the
United Nations negotiations expressly forbids it.38
EVOLVING LAW OF TH SEA
In 1969 the United Nations General Assembly adopted what is
popularly called the Moratorium Resolution which requires that
States refrain from exploiting the deep seabed until international
control is effected.39 The United States and twenty-seven other
gimes, 7 INT'L LAw. 796, 798, 807-12 (1973). But see Burton, supra note 24, at 1156-
57.
Another argument rests, by way of analogy, on the recognition of rights to sed-
entary marine species, such as oysters, sponge, and coral, that lie beyond national
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Goldie, The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries Off the
Australian Coasts, 1 SYDNEY L. REV. 84 (1953); Hurst, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?,
[1923-24] Brarr. Y.B. INT'L L. 34;, U MCDOUGAL & W. BurKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE OCEANS 635 (1962). But see Burton, supra note 24, at 1154-56; Saffo, supra note
30, at 502-03.
33. Burton, supra note 24, at 1153. See generally id. at 1151-59; Saffo, supra
note 30, at 506; Note, supra note 24, at 1256.
34. Deepsea Ventures' claim, see note 3 supra, was expressly rejected, and
United States legislation to permit deep seabed mining has been criticized by de-
veloped and developing countries alike. See, e.g., 9 UNCLOS III OR (109th mtg.)
105, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62 (1978) (U.S.S.R. joins the Group of 77 in protesting pro-
posed U.S. legislation).
35. See text accompanying notes 49-59 infra.
36. See Fisheries Case, [1951] LC.J. 116, 131; Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927]
P.C.LJ., ser. A., No. 10, at 28. Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] LC.J. 1,
44 (apparently approves the doctrine).
37. See, e.g., Hearings on the Law of the Sea Before the Subcomm. on Oceans
and International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1975).
38. Statement of the Group of 77, supra note 27.
39. GA. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
The operative paragraph reads as follows:
The General Assembly... [d]eclares that, pending the establishment
of the aforementioned international rdgime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from
all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof; beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recog-
nized.
Id. at 11.
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industrial nations cast their votes against the resolution.4 o In do-
ing so the United States reaffirmed its position that nonexclusive
deep seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas available to all
nations and insisted that it did not consider the Moratorium Reso-
lution binding.41
A year later the United States supported a United Nations reso-
lution known as the Declaration of Principles.42 This resolution
declares the seabed to be the "common heritage of mankind" and
not subject to appropriation or any use that is incompatible with
the international regime to be established.43
At issue is whether either of these resolutions has the force of
law. The United States claims that neither resolution is binding
without a treaty giving legal definition to the suggested princi-
40. Id. (28 other countries abstained and 62 voted for the resolution).
41. See, e.g., U.S. Position on U.N. General Assembly Moratorium Resolution, 9
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 831, 831-32 (1970); Statement by Ambassador Phillips, 62
DEP'T STATE BULL. 89, 92 (1970); Announcement by President Nixon on United
States Oceans Policy (May 23, 1970), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/22 (1970)
(mimeograph) and in 9 IT'L LEGAL MATERIAlS 807, 808 (1970). See generally Gol-
die, supra note 32, at 816.
42. GA. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
(passed by a vote of 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions). The first six articles of the reso-
lution state:
The General Assembly ... [s]olemnly declares that-
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the
resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States
or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sover-
eignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire
rights with respect to the area or its resources incompatible with the in-
ternational regime to be established and the principles of this Declaration.
4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of the re-
sources of the area and other related activities shall be governed by the
international regime to be established.
5. The area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all
States, whether coastal or landlocked, without discrimination, in accord-
ance with the international regime to be established.
6. States shall act in the area in accordance with the applicable principles
and rules of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 24
October 1970, in the interests of maintaining international peace and se-




ples." The Group of 77 claims that the Declaration of Principles
is binding at least to the extent that no State may undertake re-
source exploitation without the consent of the international com-
munity.45 According to this view, the Declaration of Principles in
effect establishes the moratorium that the United States rejected
in the earlier resolution.46
Under the United Nations Charter, General Assembly resolu-
tions are only "recommendations" and, therefore, not legally
binding.47 It has become a clear precept of international law,
however, that under certain conditions United Nations resolutions
may claim varying degrees of legal validity.8 When, for example,
a resolution verbalizes the opinio juris of the international com-
munity, the resolution represents binding international law." In
such a situation the resolution does not create the law, but rather
reflects pre-existing law created by a general consensus of opin-
ion or practice.5 0 Nevertheless, the resolution identifies and for-
44. See, e.g., 9 UNCLOS IlI OR (109th mtg.) 104, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62 (1978)
(statement of U.S. Ambassador Elliot Richardson); COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSU-
LAR AFFAIRS, PROMOTING THE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF HARD MImERAL RE-
SOURCES IN THE DEEP SEABED, PENDING ADOPTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME
RELATING THERETO, HR. Doc. No. 588, pt. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977); Letter
from John Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Dep't of State, to Senator Metcalf (Jan.
16, 1970), reprinted in Hearings on Issues Related to Establishment of Seaward
Boundary of United States Outer Continental Shelf Before the Special Subcomm.
on the Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 210 (1969-1970).
45. Statement of the Group of 77, supra note 27.
46. See, e.g., Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act Hearings and Markup on H.R.
2759 Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 411
(1979) (dissenting views of Congressman MeCloskey); Deep Seabed Mineral Re-
sources Act Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Resources and Materials
Production and Senate Commerce Science and Transportation Comm. to Consider
S. 493, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 93-94 (1979) (statement of Berkley Bedell). But
see Goldie, supra note 32, at 818.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 10; accord, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom
v. Iceland), [1974] LC.J. 3,23-24. But cf. Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure on
Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-
West Africa, [1955] LC.J. 67, 115, 118, 120 (Lauterpacht, J., separate opinion) (reso-
lutions may have a minimum legal relevance which, over a period of time, may re-
sult in a cumulative obligatory effect); Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951]
I.C.J. 116, 148-49 (because of the dynamic nature of the modern world, U.N. resolu-
tions are replacing customary law as the major source of international law).
48. Texaco Case (International Companies v. Libya) 104 J. du droit intl 350
(1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1978) ("[Wihile it is now possible
to recognize that resolutions of the United Nations have a certain legal value, this
legal value differs considerably"); Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer
Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965);
Comment, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AB.
J. IuT'L L. 296 (1977).
49. Cheng, supra note 48, at 35-39.
50. The conventional view is that customary law requires both a consensus of
opinion (opiniojuris) and the existence of a practice (consuetudo). But for a con-
vincing argument that the role of usage is merely evidentiary, see id. at 36:
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malizes the latent legal principle, and thus itself becomes
authoritative.5'
The difficulty lies in determining whether or not a particular
General Assembly resolution crystallizes the opinio Jr.iw' of the
international community. One of the most important considera-
tions 52 is an analysis of the vote that produced the resolution.53 A
unanimous vote is at least presumptive evidence that the resolu-
tion expresses the opinio juris of the nations involved.54 If the
nations voting represent all geographical areas and all economic
systems, the presumption is virtually incontestable.55
Using this approach, the Declaration of Princples,56 which de-
clares the seabed to be the common heritage of mankind, is bind-
ing international law,57 whereas the Moratorium Resolution,58
which forbids mining without international approval, is not. Be-
Not only is it unnecessary that the usage be prolonged, but there need
also be no usage at all in the sense of repeated practice, provided that the
opinio juris of the States concerned can be clearly established. Conse-
quently, international customary law has in reality only one constitutive
element, the opinio juris. Where there is opinio juris, there is a rule of
international customary law.
51. Texaco Case (International Companies v. Libya) 104 J. du droit int'l 350
(1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERiAus 1 (1978) (provisions that proclaim
rules recognized by the community of nations do not create a custom but confirm
one).
52. Along with an analysis of the intent of the drafters, the type of resolution
involved, the precision of the language, the level and authority of the governmen-
tal representatives who approve the agreement, and the subsequent treatment of
the agreement (for example whether or not it is registered under Article 102 of the
United Nations Charter).
53. Texaco Case (International Companies v. Libya) 104 J. du droit intl 350
(1977), reprinted in 17 INr'L LEGAL MATERIAIs 1 (1978) (analysis of voting pattern
deemed significant).
54. In the context of outer space negotiations, the U.S.S.R. undertook to re-
spect principles of a declaration "if it were unanimously adopted"; the representa-
tive of the United Kingdom stated that "a resolution, if adopted unanimously,
would be most authoritative"; and the United States delegate stated that "[wIhen
a General Assembly resolution proclaimed principles of international law.., and
was adopted unanimously, it represented the law as generally accepted in the in-
ternational community." Cheng, supra note 48, at 25-26.
55. See, e.g., Texaco Case (International Companies v. Libya) 104 J. du droit
int'l 350 (1977), reprinted in 17 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALs 1, 28 (1978).
56. Supra note 42.
57. Consistent United States support for this principle is undeniable.
In 1966 President Johnson stated:
Under no circumstances... must we ever allow the prospects of rich har-
vest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition
among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab
and to hold the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep
seas and ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings.
cause the Moratorium Resolution lacks the support of the indus-
trialized world,5 9 it does not represent the consensus of
international opinion necessary to the formation of binding cus-
tomary law.
There are, however, other methods whereby a resolution that is
technically nonbinding can acquire some degree of legal validity.
According to the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs:
[A declaration] may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ
adopting it, a strong expectation that members of the international com-
munity will abide by it. Consequently, in so far as the expectation is grad-
ually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become
recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.6 0
A United Nations resolution is, at the very least, evidence that the
subject matter is of international concern. It represents the opin-
ion of a substantial portion of the international community and
must be taken into consideration. 61 Subsequent State practice is
the determining factor. If States in fact conform to the rule over
President's Remarks at the Commissioning of the Research Ship, the "Ocea-
nographer," 2 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 930, 931 (July 18, 1966).
In August of 1968 the United States voted for the Report of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee of the United Nations which stated that the exploration and use of the seabed
and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof and the exploitation of their resources
should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of mankind.
In December of 1968 the United States voted in favor of General Assembly Reso-
lution 2467 A which stated that the exploitation of the seabed should be carried
out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, taking into account the special interests
and needs of the developing countries.
In May of 1970 President Nixon proposed that-
[Ajil nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under which they would
renounce all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed...
and would agree to regard these resources as the common heritage of
mankind.
United States Oceans Policy, 6 WEEKLY ComI'. OF PRES. Doc. 677 (May 25, 1970).
See also Hearings on Issues Related to Establishment of Seaward Boundary of
United States Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 427 (1970) (statements of Elliot Richardson,
Under-Secretary of State, and John Stevenson, Legal Advisor of the Dep't of
State).
In August of 1970 the United States submitted to the United Nations Seabed
Committee a draft proposal which stated that the deep seabed area should be the
common heritage of mankind. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/25 (1970).
In December the United States voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution
2749, the Declaration of Principles, which "[r]ecognizing that the existing legal re-
gime of the high seas does not provide substantive rules for regulating the ex-
ploitation of the aforesaid area and exploitation of its resources," declared that the
resources of the area "are the common heritage of mankind." Supra note 42.
58. Supra note 42.
59. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
60. Memorandum of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs on the "Use of the Terms
'Declaration and Recommendation."
61. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2; Hearing on S. 2801 Before the Subcomm.
on Minerals and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1972) (statement of John Stevenson, Legal Advisor of the Dep't
of State) (the Moratorium Resolution must be given "good faith consideration").
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an extended period, the rule becomes customary and, therefore,
binding on principles akin to estoppel.62 The subjective opinion
or motive of a State is irrelevant in this regard; it is the actual rec-
ognition of, or acquiescence in, the rule that is dispositive.63
Under this view the Moratorium Resolution may be well on its
way to becoming customary law. It could be argued that by refus-
ing to support private claims64 and by delaying national mining
legislation65 the United States has acquiesced to the binding char-
acter of the Moratorium Resolution-regardless of diplomatic pro-
tests to the contrary.66
The progress achieved at the ninth session of UNCLOS m67
makes an authoritative consensus in the form of a binding treaty
possible.68 The compromise on the issue of deep seabed mining
permits parallel exploitation by private companies and by a min-
ing company representing the international community.69 There
may be no agreement on the underlying issues, but peaceful coex-
istence now seems attainable.
While there is widespread agreement that the seabed is "the
common heritage of mankind,"7 0 there is sharp disagreement over
62. See MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, 7 Ir'L Cohn'. LQ. 468
(1958); Rubin, The International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 Am. J.
INT'L L. 1, 16-17 (1977).
63. See Cheng, supra note 48, at 36.
64. See note 3 supra.
65. Unilateral deep seabed mining legislation has been introduced in every
congressional session since 1972. Only in 1977, however, did the Administration
lend official support to such legislation although it had threatened to do so for
some time. See Report, A Report on Legislation: The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
Resources Act, 10 LAw. Am RscAs; 963 (1979). See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 9, H.R.
7732, and H.R. 12,233 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 28-29 (1973-1974)
(statement of Charles Brower, Acting Legal Advisor of the Dep't of State).
66. That the Administration is aware of this international booby-trap was
shown recently by the leak of a classified communication directing the Navy to
send ships into the disputed waters of'nations that claim a territorial limit of more
than three miles "because simply protesting diplomatically about such limits
would not be effective." N.Y. Times, August 10, 1979, § A, at 1, col 3. It may also
explain, in part, the Administration's change of opinion regarding unilateral sea-
bed mining legislation.
67. In August 1980.
68. Recent announcements indicate that the Reagan administration intends to
block the completion of the treaty which had been expected in the spring of 1981.
The intricate balance achieved by years of negotiations may be lost in the shift to
the policies of an eager new administration.
69. ICNT/Rev. 2 at Annex 3, art. 3.
70. See text accompanying notes 42-57 supra.
what that concept means.71 The Group of 77 claims it means that
the seabed belongs to the international community as a whole
which must give its approval before any resources can be re-
moved.72 The developed nations, on the other hand, claim that
the common heritage concept permits anyone to exploit the sea-
bed.73 Both positions are calcified by insistent economic inter-
ests. The countries with the technological capability of exploiting
seabed minerals are mineral-importing countries, anxious to se-
cure a plentiful and reliable source of supply.74 Many of the coun-
tries lacking technological capability are mineral-exporting
countries, are anxious to maintain their current market
advantage.75
Added to this already complex equation is the ideological de-
bate over the developing nations' demand for a new order that
would close the economic gap between developed and developing
countries.76 The political force of this movement, 77 coupled with
possession of scarce resources, gives the developing nations bar-
gaining power sufficient to hold the developed countries, with
their superior military and technological strength, temporarily at
bay.78
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
International negotiations regarding the law of outer space have
roughly paralleled those regarding the law of the sea.79 The prin-
ciples agreed to in the 1967 United Nations "Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
71. See, e.g., Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Polit-
ical, Moral or Legal Innovation?, 9 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 390 (1972); Saffo, supra note
30.
72. See, e.g., 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 22) 89, 97, U.N. Doc. A/7622 (1969). The
United States supports an international agency with limited authority. See, e.g.,
U.N. Draft Convention of the International Seabed Area, reprinted in 9 INV'L LE-
GAL MATERLALS 1046 (1970).
73. 9 UNCLOS MI OR (109th mtg.) 104, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62 (1978) (state-
ment of U.S. Ambassador Elliot Richardson).
74. See Ratiner & Wright, United States Ocean Mineral Resource Interests and
the United Nations' Conference on the Law of the Sea, 6 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 1,
14 (1973).
75. Id. at 20. See Friedman & Williams, supra note 26, at 573 (special interests
of the land-based producing States significantly influence negotiating positions).
76. Howe, Power In the Third World, 29 J. INT'L AFF. 113, 122-25 (1975).
77. Id.
78. Arnold, Toward A Principled Approach to the Distribution of Global
Wealth. An Impartial Solution to Disputes Over Seabed Nodules, 17 SAN D -EGO L.
REv. 557 (1980).
79. For an excellent history of the developments in space law leading up to
the current Moon Treaty, see Skorheim & White, The Law of Outer Space: A Sym-
bol of Social Maturity, 6 W. ST. UL. REV. 101, 107-40 (1979).
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Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"o
(Outer Space Principles) will be readily recognized by law of the
sea experts. The first four articles, for example, set out the fol-
lowing familiar principles: 1) Outer space activities shall be car-
ried out for the benefit of all countries irrespective of their degree
of economic or political development; 2) Outer space shall be the
province of mankind; 3) Outer space shall be open to exploration
and use by all States in accordance with international law;
4) Outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty or by any other means; 5) The United Nations
Charter applies to outer space; and 6) Outer space shall be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes.81
The negotiations of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), in attempting to
80. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5.
81. Article I
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific develop-
ment, and shall be the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free
for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, a
basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and en-
courage international co-operation in such investigation.
Article II
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not sub-ject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.
Article HI
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Na-
tions, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and understanding.
Article IV
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-
ons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or sta-
tion such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of mil-
itary bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weap-
ons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any
other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equip-
ment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other
celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Id. arts. I-IV.
draft a treaty based on those principles, 82 revolved around the is-
sue of the exploitation of natural resources. As in the law of the
sea, this issue was generally recognized to be the problem whose
solution would facilitate agreement on the other unresolved is-
sues.83 For eight years statesmen and scholars argued about the
meaning and effect of the common heritage concept,84 the desira-
bility of a moratorium,85 and the interests of the developing coun-
tries86 in much the same manner as their maritime counterparts.
In 1979 a compromise was achieved. The developed countries
agreed to accept Brazil's formulation of the common heritage
principle: "The moon and its natural resources are the common
heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions
of this Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this arti-
cle."8 7 The pertinent section of paragraph five reads as follows:
"States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish
an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to gov-
ern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such
exploitation is about to become feasible."8 8 In effect the devel-
oped States have agreed that the common heritage principle
means that an international regime should control resource ex-
ploitation. In exchange for this concession, the developing coun-
tries agreed not to insist on a provision imposing a moratorium on
exploitation pending the establishment of the international re-
gime.89 Thus the Moon TreatyO expresses no moratorium, and
none is implied by its legislative history.9 1
The result is that the debate about what the common heritage
of mankind means has been set to rest in a treaty that may be-
come binding international law. The underdeveloped countries
have won the ideological debate which appears to bolster their ec-
onomic position. But, like the moon itself, this arrangement has
its dark side. The lack of a moratorium on exploitation, in con-
82. As requested by GA. Res. 2779 (XXVI) of Nov. 29, 1971.
83. U.N. General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Report of the Legal Sub-Comm. on the Work of its Eighteenth Session (12 March -
6 April 1979), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/248 (1979), reprinted in 7 J. SPACE L 51, 57
(1979).
84. See, e.g., Bueckling, The Strategy of Semantics and the "Mankind Provi-
sions" of the Space Treaty, 7 J. SPACE L. 15 (1979); Fasan, The Meaning of the Term
"Mankind" in Space Legal Language, 2 J. SPACE L. 125 (1974).
85. See, e.g., Goedhuis, The Changing Legal Regime of Air and Outer Space, 27
I N'L & Cozep. L.Q. 576 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Christol, Space Joint Ventures: The United States and Developing
Nations, 8 AKRON L. REV. 398 (1975).
87. Moon Treaty, supra note 13, art. XI, para. 1.
88. Id. at para. 5.
89. Hosenball, supra note 16, at 100.
90. Moon Treaty, supra note 13.
91. Hosenball, supra note 16, at 103-04.
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junction with a provision that allows property rights in resources
after their extraction from the natural environment, 92 makes the
practical effect of the compromise exactly what the developed
countries wanted. Exploitation will be allowed on a "first come,
first served" basis accompanied only by a duty to try to set up an
international regime. 93 Under these conditions the developed
countries will have no economic incentive to establish an interna-
tional regime which might restrict their access, control their pro-
duction, and tax their profits. There will be political pressure to
do so, but because it will be to the advantage of the developed
countries to postpone international control indefinitely, the pro-
jected regime will have to be based on their terms or not be estab-
lished at all.
This mirrors the history of the law of the sea negotiations. It
was to the advantage of the developing countries to prevent the
establishment of the International Seabed Resources Authority as
long as the developed countries could be restrained by political or
economic means from exploiting the resources in the interim.
Only when unilateral action was inevitable was a compromise
achieved. In the Moon Treaty the underlying dilemma remains
the same, but the actors have changed places. It is now the devel-
oped countries who will benefit from impasse.
If, when exploitation of the moon becomes feasible, the devel-
oped countries can act on the basis of principle, unclouded by im-
mediate marketplace interests, the effect of the Moon Treaty's
compromise is harmless. Law of the sea experience, however,
teaches that such fortitude is unlikely. Because the Moon Treaty
applies not only to the moon itself, but to all nonterrestial bodies
in our solar system,94 the potential for inequity is enormous.
A PROPOSED RECONCILIATION
Although the seabed and the surface of the moon differ physi-
cally, their legal natures are the same. Like the high seas and the
92. "Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof
or natural resources in place shall become property of any State ... or of any nat-
ural person." Moon Treaty, supra note 13, art. XI, para. 3 (emphasis added).
93. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
94. Moon Treaty, supra note 13, art. I, para. 1: "The provisions of this Agree-
ment relating to the moon shall also apply to other celestial bodies within the so-
lar system, other than the earth, except in so far as specific legal norms enter into
force with respect to any of these celestial bodies."
antarctic, the seabed and the moon are withdrawn from national
sovereignty and open for use by all members of the international
community.95 In theory, therefore, the same principles should ap-
ply to both. Indeed in practice most of the existing law is analo-
gous if not identical.96 International argument about the meaning
of the term "common heritage of mankind" is diminishing, but the
fundamental practical difficulties are unchanged. Resource ex-
ploitation will remain the subject of heated and prolonged inter-
national debate until a practical method of resource management
'is adopted.
One logical way to solve the dilemma is to see to it that no one
benefits from impasse-in effect to take away the trump card. If
the Moon Treaty were to recognize the community ownership of
resources and establish a regime to control exploitation and dis-
tribute prospective wealth now-before specific economic inter-
ests prejudice the outcome97-the bargaining positions would be
equalized as far as possible.
Starting from the assumption that justice depends on impartial-
ity, John Rawls98 suggests that impartial decision-making can
occur only where. the p@rticipants are free of self-interest.99 To
accomplish this the decision-makers must assume a conceptual
"veil of ignorance."oo '"They do not know how the various alter-
natives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged
to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considera-
tions."10 Because participants are prevented from knowing what
95. See, e.g., Dekanozov, Relationship Between the Status of Outer Space and
the Statuses of Areas Withdrawn from State Sovereignty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTEENTH COLLOQUIUm ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 9 (M. Schwartz ed. 1974).
96. See text accompanying notes 79-86 supra.
97. The treaty has already encountered some resistance from the 4,000 mem-
ber L-5 Society, which hopes to see a space colony built in orbit around the moon.
Lunar Dustup, TaE, Mar. 24, 1980, at 47. The society has hired Washington lobby-
ist Leigh S. Ratiner who for 5 years was the chief spokesman for seabed mining
interests. Broad, Earthlings at Odds Over Moon Treaty, 206 SCL 915, 915 (1979).
One aerospace industry, United Technologies, has placed an ad in the Washington
Post attacking the treaty. According to the ad
The draft agreement would have the effect of imposing an indefinite delay
on commercial development of space at a time when the U.S. is a world
leader in space technology .... If the draft treaty stands up in Congress,
American inventiveness and enterprise would be shut off from the indus-
trialization of space.
Thrashing Out the Moon Treaty, 117 SCL NEws 135 (1980).
98. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
99. "Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put
men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their
own advantage." Id. at 136.
100. I at 136-42; see Arnold, supra note 78, for a suggested application of this
theory to the law of the sea negotiations.
101. J. RAwLS, supra note 98, at 137-38.
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role they will play in the order they establish, they will choose
principles that apply fairly to all groups.102
Although this ideal situation can never be completely real-
ized,103 it is possible to minimize the negative effects of self-inter-
est by setting up a legal regime before specific interests have
vested. In negotiations for a lunar regime the veil of ignorance
would be gossamer at best because the developed nations know
that they are likely to be the first to have the technological capa-
bility to exploit whatever resources become available.104 This ad-
vantage can be offset, however, by a definite and substantial
commitment to share revenue or technology with members of the
class of countries defined as underdeveloped by the agreement.
A substantial commitment will be more palatable to developed
nations before specific resource interests are realized for two rea-
sons. First, promises of benevolence in the future are more likely
to be based on principles of equity and less likely to be narrowed
by self-interest than are promises of immediate benevolence.
Second, the commitment can be made without substantial protest
when it is still unknown which sector of the economy will be af-
fected. Once the commitment is made, it becomes a given fact in-
cluded in any calculation of possible profit. It is seen as a
prerequisite to the venture rather than as a loss of projected prof-
it.
Because it will be unknown which sector of the economy will be
adversely affected by competition with moon-based industries,
the decision to protect existing industry or let the risk fall where
it will can be based on principle rather than on self-interest. Sim-
ilarly, the absence of strong lobbying efforts by specific interest
groupsI 05 will enable diplomats to convince governments of the
advantages of the proposed regime in terms of equity and the
benefit of preventing future bitter conflict. Preempting the in-
volvement of specific economic interests leaves the ideological in-
terests free to negotiate a compromise regime that is more likely
to be both equitable and internationally acceptable.
Even if the Moon Treaty were signed in its present form, a
102. Id. at 137.
103. And Rawls offers it only as a "viewpoint," a "perspective," or a "guide to
intuition" that "leads to a certain conception of justice." Id. at 139.
104. The recent economic crises of many developed countries may weaken the
likelihood for many.
105. But see note 97 supra.
move to set up the regime before resource exploitation becomes
feasible could be initiated at the Second United Nations Confer-
ence on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to be
held in the latter half of 1982,106 Law of the sea experience illus-
trates the difficulties encountered when legal norms trail behind
technological advances. The wiser course would be to set up the
basic framework in advance of the technology. If this were done,
the law would determine the direction of technology, rather than
the more dangerous alternative of allowing technology to deter-
mine the law. Technological might and clamorous marketplace
interests should not be allowed to dictate legal norms or there
will be no justice.
PATRICIA MINOLA
106. See 17 U.N. CHRONICLE 43 (1980).
